Hello @AppDefects ,
Thank you for bringing this to our attention. We will have our security team review this information.
Need to take as a grain of salt of these types of scans, they typically don't mean a whole lot.
Go scan dhs.gov, whitehouse.gov, etc.
Bottom line, I don't think we need to spend time and money on meeting these scans. Of course the overall security measures need to be in place, but no necessarily spending effort chasing some academic security standards.
If that site provides a reliable assessment this is certainly an embarrassment for (ISC)2.
Assuming the community site is still being 'developed' --- like I said in another post, it's like they employed the waterfall model, but re-ordered the phases --- perhaps we'll see this attended to shortly.
(I seem to be feeling over-optimistic today --- could have been something I ate... )
these types of scans, they typically don't mean a whole lot.
Unfortunately, we hear (la, la, la, la, la, not listening to you) a lot until something happens. Then it is on record that management knew about it and maybe they didn't do anything about it because someone told them not to. I wouldn't want to be in that position. I take AppSec very seriously. That is why I showed the comparison between sites and the differences in grades. Why should social media sites be a <blank>. The organization has a responsibility to protect your data and mine.
There’s security risk, and there’s risk management. For any realistic risk management, one has to evaluate the probability and the impact, then decide what is the most optimum risk treatment. One of the risk treatments is acceptance.
It is my humble opinion that in this case, acceptance should be the treatment.
If ISC2 has unlimited resources, sure, go ahead to make the residual risk next to zero.
(ISC)²'s risk is most likely reputational damage from a supplier breach. Their mitigation is to minimize non-public information shared with suppliers and to include a "supplier breach" scenario in their Incident Response playbook so that they are prepared to quickly respond.
My guess/hope is that (ISC)² is only sharing first/last name, email and a list of certificates held (to be turned into badges). If true, @Chuxing is on the right track regarding the severity and appropriate response.
I do suggest that if one believes there to exploit potential, the community is not the best place to start the conversation. Instead, one ought to follow responsible disclosure practices. That is, privately report the issue and a reasonable deadline to the company before you go public.