Hi All
This link, provides some interesting insights into security or rather how to bypass it.
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6579556754496028672/
Regards
Caute_cautim
I think we all have had users like this. They will do anything to by-pass the security implemented and then when something happens, they just shrug their shoulders and smile.......
I dd enjoy the humour in it though.
Clearly, this is evidence, anecdotal though it may be, that cat filters do not work
Craig
This shows that you can't bank on security controls by themselves, but should also instill awareness in users.
(Then again, training a cat might be a challenge.)
@ShannonYes, training a cat could be a real problem - especially one with 9 lives and a beating heart, pumping blood and air through the system. But probably less of a problem, if the Cat was mechanical or a robot one.
But then again we go back to the root of the problem - who was the developer who programmed and what were their morals, ethics and objectives?
Regards
Caute_cautim
@Caute_cautim wrote:
But then again we go back to the root of the problem - who was the developer who programmed and what were their morals, ethics and objectives?
Very true, but I've sometimes found that part to be even more of a daunting task --- it makes imparting user awareness & changing organization culture seem trivial.
To exemplify this, I'll relate 2 cases in an earlier organization, both involving an communication / collaboration application obtained from a provider.
Case 1: There were instances of the application's services experiencing issues due to malware & I reminded the provider to secure the platforms they ran it on with an EPP --- their lead then insisted that there was no concern because it ran on Linux!
Case 2: After observing events that pointed to 'broken authentication,' I communicated with all entities using the system / providing dependent services, and concluded that the issue was with the application itself. In a report to management, I recommended that the application be checked for vulnerabilities & its code properly reviewed.
The end result in both cases: what happened was quickly forgotten & quietly buried --- courtesy of someone high up in the hierarchy having given the provider a go-ahead at the start.
So back to your earlier question, the root of the problem often becomes 'Who authorized implementation & use, with no security controls properly implemented from the start itself?'
At this point, one can't help but envy the cats.