Hi All
1994–2026: THE ANATOMY OF A 32‑YEAR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FAILURE
The global cryptography industry wants applause for Post Quantum Cryptography - but the empirical timeline tells a very different story.
SNDL/HNDL is not new (Store Now, Decrypt Later and Harvest Now, Decrypt Later)
Mosca’s inequality is not new
Quantum‑era adversary models are not new
So the real question becomes: what exactly has the global cryptography community been doing for the last 30+ years?
Because the sudden wave of PQC “experts,” new vendors, and “vanguard” alliances is… interesting. Especially when you look at the empirical timeline of institutional inertia:
1994-Shor publishes the algorithm: the threat becomes mathematically real
1996–2015-Two decades of silence:
• No global discovery standards
• No inventory protocols
• No governance frameworks
• No cryptographic visibility
• No lifecycle control
• No sector‑level accountability
2016–2023 -The research trap:
• Excellent algorithms
• Global conferences
• Academic progress
But still no CBOM, no retirement frameworks, no migration discipline, no visibility into real‑world estates 🔍
2024–2026 -The PQC gold rush:
• NIST finalises standards
• Suddenly everyone is a PQC “expert”
• New frameworks, new certifications, new consultancies
• Everyone claims they’ve “solved” quantum risk 🚀
Solved what, exactly?
The problem ignored for 30 years?
Or the visibility gap the industry still cannot measure?
The reality in 2026:
We are entering the “Year of Quantum Security” with no global standard for discovering cryptography, no standard for representing it, and most organisations still unable to identify their own dependencies. SNDL exposure is already baked in.
This leads to a far more provocative question for the Boardroom:
If we’ve known about the threat for 30 years, why are CEOs and Boards still sitting this one out? Why is this being treated as a “technical project” for the CIO or CISO, rather than a fundamental threat to long‑term organisational viability?
The CTO and CIO have equally difficult questions to answer:
Why was cryptographic inventory not a BAU requirement a decade ago?
Why are we only now discussing discovery when harvesting has been happening for years?
Is the current PQC programme a strategy or just an expensive emergency patch for 30 years of accumulated technical debt?
Post Quantum Cryptography is essential, but it is not a triumph. It is a late‑stage corrective.
Scott’s SNDL question made the point unavoidable: you cannot retroactively secure what has already been harvested.
If the global cryptography industry wants applause, it should start with the truth:
We are not ahead.
We are catching up.
And we’re doing it late
Governance. Visibility. Discovery. Lifecycle control.
Maybe this should be posted under Governance, Risk and Compliance too.
Full reference: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bcouzens_pqc-pqc-quantum-share-7429417246638243840-8HEc?utm_source=sh...
Regards
Caute_Cautim
