Hi All
Here is Part 1:
Demystifying Post quantum Topics — Part 1
As I fly back from the PKI Consortium’s PQC Conference in Kuala Lumpur, I’m wrapping up days filled with insightful talks and energizing conversations. Among the many ideas that kept my mind busy, one stands out: demystifying a few topics that, in my view, carry too much weight in the post quantum cryptography (PQC) conversation.
Over several days, brilliant post quantum experts gathered to exchange ideas and energize everyone’s neurons. Some discussions navigated through well-established concepts and recommendations. Sometimes I found myself disagreeing with them. Responding to these provided an enlightening opportunity to challenge and clarify ideas that many hold firmly.
With full respect for differing opinions and in the spirit of healthy debate, I intend to challenge four commonly accepted notions in a slightly provocative way to encourage you, dear reader, to reconsider your current analysis. I’ll publish each reflection in a separate article over the coming days.
Let’s begin with the first one
Organizations Should Not Worry Too Much About “Y2Q”
“When will Y2Q arrive?” is an omnipresent question in most talks, articles, and recommendations. It’s used for various purposes: sometimes to warn of an imminent risk, sometimes to spark curiosity, and other times to dismiss the threat due to the uncertainty around quantum cryptanalysis progress.
However, this question often creates distraction and uncertainty among decision-makers. Quantum computing and cryptography are complex subjects, and no one can confidently predict a date. Several hyped forecasts from a few years ago about production-grade quantum computers have not materialized, fueling skepticism.
Organizations need facts and certainty. They must keep their communications secure and interoperable in an increasingly hyperconnected world, which means adopting secure standards.
Facts beat speculation
According to NIST IR 8547 (ipd), classical public-key cryptography will be disallowed by 2035, and today’s most common configurations will be deprecated by 2030.
National security agencies (NSAs) and other bodies around the world are setting similar schedules. So if there’s a global consensus, it’s this:
✅ Transition critical use cases to PQC by 2030-2031
✅ Complete migration by 2035
That’s as clear, relevant, and broadly agreed upon as it gets. Y2Q isn’t.
You will not find any more relevant or broadly agreed-upon milestones. Y2Q is not one of them. These official timelines should serve as the foundation for every organization’s migration roadmap.
Everyone has a role to play:
- Security agencies identify threats.
- Standardization bodies define the rules.
- Organizations do business securely and interoperably by following those standards.
Focusing on these dates also strengthens internal sponsorship. Y2Q frames the issue as a speculative cybersecurity risk; compliance with evolving standards makes it a concrete regulatory requirement, especially vital in regulated industries.
The two common objections I hear
1️⃣ “What if Y2Q happens earlier?”
The published timelines are already quite tight. The current issue is that the Y2Q narrative often promotes crypto-procrastination, delaying decisive actions to initiate the transition, due to the lack of concrete milestones and facts. A compliance-driven mindset, by contrast, promotes decisive, measurable progress. If Y2Q arrives sooner than expected, we can expect the NSAs and standards bodies to update the official milestones.
2️⃣ “What if Y2Q is delayed — or never comes?”
This highlights how the Y2Q framing leads to crypto-procrastination. The initial steps of PQC transition are no-regret moves that strengthen cryptographic management, putting it on par with other cybersecurity practices such as vulnerability management. By starting now, organizations will be better prepared to address vulnerabilities, whether quantum-related or not (such as poorly managed keys or certificates), and will be able to adapt rapidly when necessary.
The compliance reality
From a compliance standpoint, crypto-procrastinating is risky. Who would take responsibility for assuming that NSAs and standardization bodies are wrong? Failing to act on the hope that PQC won’t be needed is hard to justify under current regulations such as
What happens if an organization delays migration for a few years and the quantum-vulnerable cryptography end of life policy stay in place? The costs and risks of a rushed migration, or the reputational damage from maintaining non-compliant cybersecurity practices, can be severe. Moreover, compliant organizations are unlikely to delay their own transitions simply to maintain backward compatibility with laggards. Betting against established standards could even be existentially risky for a single organization.
In summary
In my view, organizations and the PQC community supporting them should not use Y2Q as the guiding principle for defining transition milestones. That responsibility lies with NSAs and standardization bodies. Organizations must follow standards, not speculation.
This doesn’t mean they should ignore advances in quantum computing or other cryptanalytic threats, but these developments should inform awareness, not dictate strategy. Roadmaps should be grounded in standardization and compliance, not in hypothetical countdowns.
Source: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-organizations-should-stop-worrying-y2q-start-jaime-g%C3%B3mez-gar...
Regards
Caute_Cautim
