Quantum Tech and Espionage: What Every Researcher ...

Caute_cautim · ‎08-12-2025

Hi All

Introduction
Catalyst in Vienna – Personal Spy Encounter That Sparked This Piece
Global Quantum Technology Espionage Incidents
Chinese Espionage Incidents in Quantum Technology
2019 – Chinese Talent Program Infiltration of Western Labs
2019 – FBI Warns of Campus Recruitment
Jan 2020 – Arrest of Harvard’s Charles Lieber
2022–2023 – Stanford “Charles Chen” Spy Case
2023 – Espionage Warnings and Ongoing Cyber Theft
Russian Espionage Incidents in Quantum Technology
2015 (Exposed 2018) – Russian Spy Infiltration Sting in New York
2018–2021 – Russian Cyber Attacks on Quantum Research
2022-2025 – Procurement Fronts
2010-2025 – Deep‑Cover AcademicsOngoing
United States - Deep-Tech Espionage and Manipulation
Other Actors
2013-2017 – Iran
2024 – North Korea
2021 – Iran–North Korea via Singapore/Japan
2008 – France–Iran
2023 – Malaysia and Japan in Australia
Espionage Tactics Targeting Quantum Researchers
Unvetted “Visitors” or Posing Researchers
Unauthorized Devices & Tech Implants
Pretext Invitations and Travel Traps
Suspicious Collaboration or Funding Offers
Assertive Summons by Powerful Agencies
Phishing, Cyber Attacks & Device Thefts
Honey Traps and Kompromat
Insider Recruitment, Bribery and Blackmail
Planted Moles and False Interns
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Social Media Mining
Physical Surveillance and Eavesdropping
Why Quantum Tech Draws Spies Like Flies
Common-Sense Defenses: How to Outsmart the Spies
Cultivate Healthy Skepticism
Guard Your Research and Data
Cyber Hygiene Matters
Secure Your Physical Workspace
Travel Vigilantly
Learn to Spot Elicitation
Stay Unpredictable
Be Wary of Unsolicited Gifts and Favors
Mind Your Public Footprint
Fortify Your Institution’s Policies
Plan for “What-If” Scenarios

Introduction

I’ve spent my career straddling two worlds that rarely intersect: cutting-edge technologies and their risks, and counter-intelligence. My early days were spent thwarting intelligence threats, and from there, I transitioned into cybersecurity and industrial counter-espionage, advising some of the world’s largest aerospace, pharma, and manufacturing companies, including one of the top global semiconductor foundries, on industrial and economic counter-espionage. This work spanned everything from cyber defense and countering insider threats, to foiling human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and detecting surveillance tools like hidden cameras and nano-drones. Along the way I developed a comprehensive counter-industrial-espionage framework and tools now used by several Fortune 500 organizations. In short, I’ve seen the industrial and economic espionage threat up close.

After a period spent as a quantum technology entrepreneur, I returned to cybersecurity, and eventually back to quantum and founded Applied Quantum. Recently, as I’ve again become deeply immersed in the quantum ecosystem, collaborating closely with startups, research labs, and academic partners; I’ve observed a worrying resurgence of familiar espionage patterns. Surprisingly, even Applied Quantum, which primarily provides advisory services rather than core research, has been directly targeted. This tells me espionage actors are casting an extraordinarily wide net. They’re no longer selective; if you’re involved in quantum technology in any capacity, you’re on their radar.

Just to be clear: we, as Applied Quantum, don't offer any related services. I won't be able to strengthen your OPSEC (operational security) or perform TSCM (technical surveillance counter-measures). I'm not selling anything related - I'm writing this as a public service to my quantum tech network about a very real danger: the espionage campaign targeting quantum tech researchers.

This is not fiction or paranoid fantasy. It’s happening right now, often without the victims ever realizing it until it’s too late. If you’re skeptical, consider that every tactic I listed below I’ve encountered in my career, and many of them I've seen in action again recently. Even Western counter-intelligence chiefs have warned that fields like quantum computing face espionage “at real scale,” now extending beyond traditional government or military targets to hit startups, academic labs, and individuals who “may not think national security is about them”. FBI’s Quantum Information Science Counter‑Intelligence Protection Team has also warned that foreign adversaries, are now using “non‑traditional collectors, economic and academic influence, and other asymmetric intelligence operations” to penetrate companies, universities and national labs working on quantum research. German military counter‑intelligence also reports that Russia has doubled its hybrid‑espionage caseload in 2025 and is “more massive and more aggressive” in targeting NATO‑linked research - including cutting‑edge technologies such as quantum. Consider also some of the public reports I summarized below.

(All external sources I am referencing can be found embedded in this article's original version at PostQuantum.com/post-quantum/espionage-quantum/)

Catalyst in Vienna - Personal Spy Encounter That Sparked This Piece

Two weeks ago I found myself in Vienna, fittingly nicknamed the "Spy Capital of the World", meeting an EU‑based quantum‑hardware start‑up and an Asian investor. The trip became an unexpected field exercise in trade‑craft.

I took the train from Salzburg. The carriage was empty, yet the only other passenger in the whole carriage chose the seat two rows behind mine. He kept standing up and "photographing the countryside" behind my shoulder. I knew better than to work on anything sensitive on my laptop, but my antennae were up.

After disembarking I jumped on a call and spent the next forty‑five minutes wandering Vienna’s Hauptbahnhof. When my conversation ended, I noticed the same individual still loitering near the platforms. Odd, but the second sighting doesn’t prove surveillance - at least not yet.

Hours later, while dining with the start‑up’s founders, I spotted the same man seated at the adjacent table - this time sporting thick‑framed glasses and a fresh outfit, obviously relying on a fact that a minor costume change is often enough to fool casual observers. A second appearance might be chance; a third is surveillance. I discreetly asked the hostess for a different table, citing “better lighting,” and kept our conversation strictly high‑level, just in case.

Back at the hotel I spotted the same man, this time stationed at the lobby bar. Now, convinced I am being tailed, I decided to test my hunch that it is because of my quantum tech involvement. I ordered a drink alone and, sure enough, eventually our amateur spy slid onto the neighboring stool. I introduced myself as an agricultural‑machinery salesman, but he kept steering the chat toward quantum technology, especially quantum sensing, claiming he’d just read an "eye‑opening article" and wanted my thoughts. Textbook elicitation: build rapport, feign ignorance, then fish for expertise. I spent a few minutes extolling the virtues of vintage Lamborghini tractors, watched his frustration grow, then politely excused myself.

Applied Quantum is an advisory shop; we might sometimes help clients tune algorithms, but we don’t fabricate qubit chips. If someone invested three separate touch‑points to profile me, imagine the scrutiny aimed at laboratories sitting on genuine breakthroughs.

Global Quantum Technology Espionage Incidents

Chinese Espionage Incidents in Quantum Technology

2019 - Chinese Talent Program Infiltration of Western Labs

A 2019 report by Strider Technologies revealed a long-running Chinese strategy of sending scientists to top U.S. and European quantum research labs, then calling them back to China to boost military-linked quantum projects. Researchers from institutions like MIT, University of Colorado, and Cambridge gained Western-funded quantum expertise and later helped China achieve breakthroughs (e.g. quantum satellites and sensors) for its defense industry. This covert talent recruitment, sponsored by programs such as the Thousand Talents Plan, enabled China to acquire cutting-edge quantum know-how without outright hacking or theft, blurring the line between academic exchange and espionage.

2019 - FBI Warns of Campus Recruitment

In mid-2019, the FBI issued a public warning that foreign intelligence agents were actively recruiting students and professors at U.S. universities to obtain emerging technology research. This warning followed incidents of suspicious approaches and offered incentives to researchers in fields like quantum information science. It reflected awareness that Beijing's and Moscow’s intelligence services often use informal collectors (e.g. visiting scholars or business liaisons) in addition to hackers. The FBI alert was meant to harden academia against such espionage, which often goes unreported – a point underscored by FBI Director Wray’s characterization of intellectual property theft (including quantum IP) as “one of the largest transfers of wealth in history”.

Jan 2020 - Arrest of Harvard’s Charles Lieber

In January 2020, renowned Harvard nanoscientist Charles Lieber (then chair of Chemistry) was arrested for concealing his collaboration with China’s Thousand Talents Program. Lieber had secretly become a Wuhan University of Technology “strategic scientist,” earning $$50,000 per month, plus living expenses and over $1.5 million in research grants from China, all while receiving millions in U.S. funding. In exchange, he agreed to share research and establish a lab in China. Lieber’s undisclosed ties (uncovered under the DOJ’s China Initiative) exposed how China’s talent-recruitment programs effectively bribed insiders to transfer quantum and nanotechnology research. He was convicted in Dec 2021 of lying about foreign ties, underscoring the espionage risks in academic partnerships.

2022–2023 - Stanford “Charles Chen” Spy Case

In 2023, Stanford University uncovered that a suspected Chinese Ministry of State Security agent had posed for years as a Stanford student under the alias “Charles Chen”. This impostor aggressively targeted U.S. students and researchers working on sensitive tech topics, even offering a Stanford student researching China’s AI policy an all-expenses-paid trip to Beijing and attempting to shift communications to monitored platforms like WeChat. The ruse, revealed by a student and reported in 2025, is emblematic of China’s “non-traditional collectors” tactic, using students or visiting scholars as spies. In this case, the agent’s goal was to recruit future talent or glean research insights, and it was foiled when the student involved alerted authorities. Experts note this incident is part of a broader pattern of Chinese intelligence gathering on campus, beyond traditional cyber theft.

Thanks Marin Ivezic

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/quantum-tech-espionage-what-every-researcher-must-know-marin-ivezic-o...

Regards

Caute_Cautim