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    <title>topic Re: Screaming Channel attack...and no, I'm not talking about US Cable News in Tech Talk</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/Screaming-Channel-attack-and-no-I-m-not-talking-about-US-Cable/m-p/15928#M565</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;The key material recovery aspect is indeed intriguing, but luckily the 1m distance forces the adversary close-in. In public, this may be a problem. However, this type of situation is exactly what TEMPEST is meant to mitigate. But, defense and intelligence have a much different threat model than most commercial shops or producers of consumer electronics.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2018 16:29:02 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Badfilemagic</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2018-10-29T16:29:02Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Screaming Channel attack...and no, I'm not talking about US Cable News</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/Screaming-Channel-attack-and-no-I-m-not-talking-about-US-Cable/m-p/15892#M559</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Saw some recent traffic here regarding secure development and IoT vulnerabilities.&amp;nbsp; I just read a &lt;A title="Screaming Channels: When Electromagnetic Side Channels Meet Radio Transceivers" href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3243802" target="_self"&gt;paper&lt;/A&gt; discussing&amp;nbsp;a recently studied problem between mixed-signal chips and the inherent electromagnetic leakage that comes with them.&amp;nbsp; The authors were able to demonstrate a complete key recovery attack to recover the key used by an AES-128 implementation at a distance of 1m.&amp;nbsp; Anyhow, just wanted to share with &lt;a href="https://community.isc2.org/t5/user/viewprofilepage/user-id/310811187"&gt;@ontheway&lt;/a&gt; and the rest of the community.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Oct 2023 08:59:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/Screaming-Channel-attack-and-no-I-m-not-talking-about-US-Cable/m-p/15892#M559</guid>
      <dc:creator>DAlexander</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-10-09T08:59:53Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Screaming Channel attack...and no, I'm not talking about US Cable News</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/Screaming-Channel-attack-and-no-I-m-not-talking-about-US-Cable/m-p/15928#M565</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;The key material recovery aspect is indeed intriguing, but luckily the 1m distance forces the adversary close-in. In public, this may be a problem. However, this type of situation is exactly what TEMPEST is meant to mitigate. But, defense and intelligence have a much different threat model than most commercial shops or producers of consumer electronics.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Oct 2018 16:29:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/Screaming-Channel-attack-and-no-I-m-not-talking-about-US-Cable/m-p/15928#M565</guid>
      <dc:creator>Badfilemagic</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2018-10-29T16:29:02Z</dc:date>
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