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    <title>topic A New Algorithm Shrinks the Quantum Attack Surface for ECC in Tech Talk</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/A-New-Algorithm-Shrinks-the-Quantum-Attack-Surface-for-ECC/m-p/88908#M5398</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;A new EUROCRYPT 2026 paper just proved both points.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Chevignard, Fouque, and Schrottenloher have cut the logical qubit count for breaking elliptic curve crypto nearly in half.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The numbers:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- P-256: 1,193 logical qubits. Down from 2,124. That's now 42% fewer qubits than breaking RSA-3072 at equivalent classical security.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- P-224: just 1,098 qubits - 21.5% less than RSA-2048.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- Asymptotically: 3.12n + o(n) qubits, down from 5n + o(n).&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;This is exactly the trajectory I flagged. When I wrote "How ECC Became the Easiest Quantum Target" (&lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/dK2UhKqA" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/dK2UhKqA&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;), the qubit counts for P-256 and RSA-3072 were roughly comparable. Now ECC is decisively easier - and the gap is widening.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;When I wrote "Bitcoin's Quantum Risk Is Closer Than You Think" (&lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/ea9_gTCT" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/ea9_gTCT&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;), it was argued that using RSA qubit estimates as a proxy for Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve was dangerously misleading. This paper confirms it: the quantum threshold for 256-bit ECC is now well below RSA-2048's.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The tradeoff is a ~1,000× increase in gate count. But qubit count has consistently been the binding hardware constraint, and if the RSA optimization pipeline repeats - where Gidney compressed the gate count 100× within months - those numbers will shrink fast.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;What security leaders should take from this:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;If your quantum risk model benchmarks against RSA estimates, you're overestimating the time available for ECC-dependent systems. Which is most systems.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The HNDL calculus for ECDH-protected traffic just shifted - a lower qubit threshold means adversaries' expected quantum payoff arrives sooner.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;ML-KEM is standardized Hybrid deployments work today. The migration window is finite and the target keeps moving.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Full analysis: &lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/ew-4Dpru" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/ew-4Dpru&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;&lt;A href="https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/algorithm-quantum-ecc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/algorithm-quantum-ecc/&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Thanks to Marin Ivezic&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Regards&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 05:19:12 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2026-03-31T05:19:12Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>A New Algorithm Shrinks the Quantum Attack Surface for ECC</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/A-New-Algorithm-Shrinks-the-Quantum-Attack-Surface-for-ECC/m-p/88908#M5398</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;A new EUROCRYPT 2026 paper just proved both points.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Chevignard, Fouque, and Schrottenloher have cut the logical qubit count for breaking elliptic curve crypto nearly in half.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The numbers:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- P-256: 1,193 logical qubits. Down from 2,124. That's now 42% fewer qubits than breaking RSA-3072 at equivalent classical security.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- P-224: just 1,098 qubits - 21.5% less than RSA-2048.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;- Asymptotically: 3.12n + o(n) qubits, down from 5n + o(n).&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;This is exactly the trajectory I flagged. When I wrote "How ECC Became the Easiest Quantum Target" (&lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/dK2UhKqA" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/dK2UhKqA&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;), the qubit counts for P-256 and RSA-3072 were roughly comparable. Now ECC is decisively easier - and the gap is widening.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;When I wrote "Bitcoin's Quantum Risk Is Closer Than You Think" (&lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/ea9_gTCT" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/ea9_gTCT&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;), it was argued that using RSA qubit estimates as a proxy for Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve was dangerously misleading. This paper confirms it: the quantum threshold for 256-bit ECC is now well below RSA-2048's.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The tradeoff is a ~1,000× increase in gate count. But qubit count has consistently been the binding hardware constraint, and if the RSA optimization pipeline repeats - where Gidney compressed the gate count 100× within months - those numbers will shrink fast.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;What security leaders should take from this:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;If your quantum risk model benchmarks against RSA estimates, you're overestimating the time available for ECC-dependent systems. Which is most systems.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The HNDL calculus for ECDH-protected traffic just shifted - a lower qubit threshold means adversaries' expected quantum payoff arrives sooner.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;ML-KEM is standardized Hybrid deployments work today. The migration window is finite and the target keeps moving.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Full analysis: &lt;A class="" href="https://lnkd.in/ew-4Dpru" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://lnkd.in/ew-4Dpru&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;&lt;A href="https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/algorithm-quantum-ecc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/algorithm-quantum-ecc/&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Thanks to Marin Ivezic&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Regards&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;DIV class=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 05:19:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/A-New-Algorithm-Shrinks-the-Quantum-Attack-Surface-for-ECC/m-p/88908#M5398</guid>
      <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-03-31T05:19:12Z</dc:date>
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