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    <title>topic An inconvenient truth about modern cryptography in Tech Talk</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/An-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/m-p/73308#M4533</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;For a week in April of 2024, the cryptologic research community was trying to make sense of a freshly announced result.&amp;nbsp; Yilei Chen of Tsinghua University in Beijing, China published a paper, “&lt;A href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555" target="_blank"&gt;Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems&lt;/A&gt;” on the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)’s ePrint Archive. &amp;nbsp;The author claimed to have discovered a quantum polynomial-time algorithm for solving certain mathematical problems, which happen to be closely related to the new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA which NIST plans finalize this year in advance of a significant national push for post-quantum cryptography.&amp;nbsp; If true, this could have led to a loss of confidence in lattice-based techniques, with huge implications for national policy.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;A week later, a flaw was found in the paper.&amp;nbsp; The author has acknowledged that the main claim is no longer justified and they did not see any workaround.&amp;nbsp; So the worry has now passed regarding this paper.&amp;nbsp; But it seems alarming that so much time and money building up cyber infrastructures that rest on cryptographic algorithms could potentially be undone by a new discovery.&amp;nbsp; It seems like a huge risk.&amp;nbsp; Is there any way to avoid the risk?&amp;nbsp; Why have we made the decision to accept it?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://pqcc.org/an-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/" target="_blank"&gt;https://pqcc.org/an-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Regards&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Aug 2024 00:15:34 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2024-08-22T00:15:34Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>An inconvenient truth about modern cryptography</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/An-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/m-p/73308#M4533</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;For a week in April of 2024, the cryptologic research community was trying to make sense of a freshly announced result.&amp;nbsp; Yilei Chen of Tsinghua University in Beijing, China published a paper, “&lt;A href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/555" target="_blank"&gt;Quantum Algorithms for Lattice Problems&lt;/A&gt;” on the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)’s ePrint Archive. &amp;nbsp;The author claimed to have discovered a quantum polynomial-time algorithm for solving certain mathematical problems, which happen to be closely related to the new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA which NIST plans finalize this year in advance of a significant national push for post-quantum cryptography.&amp;nbsp; If true, this could have led to a loss of confidence in lattice-based techniques, with huge implications for national policy.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;A week later, a flaw was found in the paper.&amp;nbsp; The author has acknowledged that the main claim is no longer justified and they did not see any workaround.&amp;nbsp; So the worry has now passed regarding this paper.&amp;nbsp; But it seems alarming that so much time and money building up cyber infrastructures that rest on cryptographic algorithms could potentially be undone by a new discovery.&amp;nbsp; It seems like a huge risk.&amp;nbsp; Is there any way to avoid the risk?&amp;nbsp; Why have we made the decision to accept it?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://pqcc.org/an-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/" target="_blank"&gt;https://pqcc.org/an-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Regards&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Aug 2024 00:15:34 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/An-inconvenient-truth-about-modern-cryptography/m-p/73308#M4533</guid>
      <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2024-08-22T00:15:34Z</dc:date>
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