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    <title>topic TLS v1.3 for PQC in Tech Talk</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/TLS-v1-3-for-PQC/m-p/66593#M4258</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;What's the issue?&lt;BR /&gt;Everything in TLS, including versions 1.2 and 1.3 is sent using data records with a limit in size. That limit was established long ago, but PQC algorithms may have larger public key sizes and cyphertexts. So, a modification to TLS1.3 might be needed to allow for larger data records.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The discussion section of the "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3" draft RFC (&lt;A href="https://lnkd.in/da5vbMac" target="_self"&gt;https://lnkd.in/da5vbMac&lt;/A&gt;, draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09) by &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAAIwv0gBY4TCfqto30IMW3fj7-cdlZwIAAU" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Douglas Stebila&lt;/A&gt;, &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAEEIsAIBWhcCr955VG_7P5VejMEV29tdtnc" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Scott Fluhrer&lt;/A&gt; and &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAAEMGIgBQdsgldMP3_0AJHLx6M4LU92qsM8" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Shay Gueron&lt;/A&gt; explains that, although some post-quantum KEMs have larger public keys and/or ciphertexts (Classic McEliece's smallest parameter set has public key size 261,120 bytes), all defined parameter sets for Kyber have public keys and ciphertexts that fall within the TLS constraints (2^16-1 bytes).&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Regards&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:52:28 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2024-01-25T22:52:28Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>TLS v1.3 for PQC</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/TLS-v1-3-for-PQC/m-p/66593#M4258</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;What's the issue?&lt;BR /&gt;Everything in TLS, including versions 1.2 and 1.3 is sent using data records with a limit in size. That limit was established long ago, but PQC algorithms may have larger public key sizes and cyphertexts. So, a modification to TLS1.3 might be needed to allow for larger data records.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;The discussion section of the "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3" draft RFC (&lt;A href="https://lnkd.in/da5vbMac" target="_self"&gt;https://lnkd.in/da5vbMac&lt;/A&gt;, draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09) by &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAAIwv0gBY4TCfqto30IMW3fj7-cdlZwIAAU" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Douglas Stebila&lt;/A&gt;, &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAEEIsAIBWhcCr955VG_7P5VejMEV29tdtnc" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Scott Fluhrer&lt;/A&gt; and &lt;A href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ACoAAAEMGIgBQdsgldMP3_0AJHLx6M4LU92qsM8" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;Shay Gueron&lt;/A&gt; explains that, although some post-quantum KEMs have larger public keys and/or ciphertexts (Classic McEliece's smallest parameter set has public key size 261,120 bytes), all defined parameter sets for Kyber have public keys and ciphertexts that fall within the TLS constraints (2^16-1 bytes).&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Regards&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;SPAN class=""&gt;&lt;SPAN&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:52:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/TLS-v1-3-for-PQC/m-p/66593#M4258</guid>
      <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2024-01-25T22:52:28Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: TLS v1.3 for PQC</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/TLS-v1-3-for-PQC/m-p/66598#M4259</link>
      <description>Need to get my TLS OOB ready for PQC or my TLAs might require LMW and my data be SOI just as my CEO goes AFK!&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Once the business lingo is fixed with the bigwigs I can have a nice leisurely digest of Pot Quantum Cryptography via the Request For Comments… &lt;span class="lia-unicode-emoji" title=":face_with_tongue:"&gt;😛&lt;/span&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jan 2024 01:44:13 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Tech-Talk/TLS-v1-3-for-PQC/m-p/66598#M4259</guid>
      <dc:creator>Early_Adopter</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2024-01-26T01:44:13Z</dc:date>
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