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    <title>topic Re: Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology in Industry News</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64119#M6466</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;It's fascinating with the parallels being drawn to Y2K*. At least in that situation, we had a firm deadline, but with "Q Day," it's a more drawn-out and vague schedule. That reality is going to challenge the transition to quantum safe cryptography.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;*Y2K required the updating of software to accommodate 4-digit years (i.e. 1999) rather than just two (i.e. 99) before the possibility a massive systems crash on Jan. 1, 2000. As a colleague of mine pointed out at the time, calling the situation "Y2K" kind of proved that the lesson didn't really sink in.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 12:51:43 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>JoePete</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2023-11-02T12:51:43Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64110#M6464</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi All&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Given the recent postings on Quantum Computing and Quantum Safe, I found these reports, which I think many will find useful.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; It comes from the UK Finance Organisation:&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/policy-and-guidance/reports-and-publications/identifying-and-minimising-risks-posed-quantum" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/policy-and-guidance/reports-and-publications/identifying-and-minimising-risks-posed-quantum&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Prepare now people.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; It is an opportunity.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Regards&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;Caute_Cautim&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 02:45:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64110#M6464</guid>
      <dc:creator>Caute_cautim</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-11-02T02:45:29Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64119#M6466</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;It's fascinating with the parallels being drawn to Y2K*. At least in that situation, we had a firm deadline, but with "Q Day," it's a more drawn-out and vague schedule. That reality is going to challenge the transition to quantum safe cryptography.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;*Y2K required the updating of software to accommodate 4-digit years (i.e. 1999) rather than just two (i.e. 99) before the possibility a massive systems crash on Jan. 1, 2000. As a colleague of mine pointed out at the time, calling the situation "Y2K" kind of proved that the lesson didn't really sink in.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 12:51:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64119#M6466</guid>
      <dc:creator>JoePete</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-11-02T12:51:43Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64124#M6467</link>
      <description>Remember to keep OpenSSL up to the latest…</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 14:45:03 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64124#M6467</guid>
      <dc:creator>Early_Adopter</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-11-02T14:45:03Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64127#M6468</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;So, what do y'all think is the timeline to see cryptographically relevant quantum computers (or CRQCs) in the hands of bad actors?&amp;nbsp; I'm assuming that companies like ColdQuanta and Pasqal (which were listed in the PDF) will probably use a cloud model (QCaaS, perhaps?) and let people go hog wild like ChatGPT did.&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 14:57:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64127#M6468</guid>
      <dc:creator>ericgeater</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-11-02T14:57:02Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Identifying and minimising the risks posed by quantum technology</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64128#M6469</link>
      <description>&lt;a href="https://community.isc2.org/t5/user/viewprofilepage/user-id/136236425"&gt;@ericgeater&lt;/a&gt; I think it’s hard to say, but it certainly possible that one or more state actors have capability(we know widespread use of malware implants obviate the need for quantum cryptanalysis anyway).&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Distributed compute is good - but it’s always possible we get new types of computer. Better Q-Bits or other novel approaches.&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;Let’s face it, threat wise you build a box that has something “as to God” about it - is the best, riskiest most dangerous/useful application to break confidentiality in mass market communications? If someone with bad intentions builds a real useful general quantum machine we might swiftly find other things to worry about… &lt;span class="lia-unicode-emoji" title=":face_with_tongue:"&gt;😛&lt;/span&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Nov 2023 15:49:50 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Industry-News/Identifying-and-minimising-the-risks-posed-by-quantum-technology/m-p/64128#M6469</guid>
      <dc:creator>Early_Adopter</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2023-11-02T15:49:50Z</dc:date>
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