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    <title>topic Reporting patching and vulnerability metrics in Governance, Risk, Compliance</title>
    <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Governance-Risk-Compliance/Reporting-patching-and-vulnerability-metrics/m-p/89270#M1473</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;I'm interested in how others are handling patching metrics.&amp;nbsp;We currently report patching using:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;% endpoints missing critical/important patches outside a 14-day SLA (aligned to UK Cyber Essentials), and&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;total high/critical vulnerabilities aged &amp;gt;14 days.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;&lt;P&gt;The idea was to show both patching coverage and the depth of exposure.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;This has worked pretty well historically, but over the last 6 months we’ve been rolling out new laptops and have hit some patching issues. As a result, we’ve now got ~16% of devices outside SLA, and they’re missing multiple patch cycles, which is driving a big spike in vulnerability counts.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I’m starting to get some pressure internally that the metrics are either too harsh or don’t reflect operational performance properly.&amp;nbsp;I still think they’re right from an infosec risk perspective.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;STRONG&gt;Interested in how others are balancing patch SLA vs vulnerability metrics in reporting?&lt;/STRONG&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 08:03:50 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Dom</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2026-04-19T08:03:50Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Reporting patching and vulnerability metrics</title>
      <link>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Governance-Risk-Compliance/Reporting-patching-and-vulnerability-metrics/m-p/89270#M1473</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;I'm interested in how others are handling patching metrics.&amp;nbsp;We currently report patching using:&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;BR /&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;UL&gt;&lt;LI&gt;% endpoints missing critical/important patches outside a 14-day SLA (aligned to UK Cyber Essentials), and&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;LI&gt;total high/critical vulnerabilities aged &amp;gt;14 days.&lt;/LI&gt;&lt;/UL&gt;&lt;P&gt;The idea was to show both patching coverage and the depth of exposure.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;This has worked pretty well historically, but over the last 6 months we’ve been rolling out new laptops and have hit some patching issues. As a result, we’ve now got ~16% of devices outside SLA, and they’re missing multiple patch cycles, which is driving a big spike in vulnerability counts.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;I’m starting to get some pressure internally that the metrics are either too harsh or don’t reflect operational performance properly.&amp;nbsp;I still think they’re right from an infosec risk perspective.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;STRONG&gt;Interested in how others are balancing patch SLA vs vulnerability metrics in reporting?&lt;/STRONG&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 08:03:50 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.isc2.org/t5/Governance-Risk-Compliance/Reporting-patching-and-vulnerability-metrics/m-p/89270#M1473</guid>
      <dc:creator>Dom</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2026-04-19T08:03:50Z</dc:date>
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